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The Colombian cut flower industry is one of the major develop-
ment success stories of the last 20 years, growing from small
beginnings in 1966 to the world's second largest exporter of cut
flowers in 1980. The industry also has become a majoremployer
of low-skill female labor.
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The Colombian  cut flower  industry  is one of the  Evolution  of the Colombian  cut flower
major development  success  stories  of the last 20  industry  illustrates  how the market system
years. The industry scarcely  existed  in 1966  but  enables  a society  to coordinate  its economic
developed  rapidly.  activities  in the most effective  way. Historically,
cut flower production  moved  from the eastem
By 1980,  Colombia  was the world's second  United  States  to the westem  and southern  states
largest  exporter  of cut flowers  after  the Nether-  and then  to Colombia.
lands, accounting  for 8 percent  of  . world
export  supply  of cut flowers,  and it continues  to  In both cases, development  of air transporta-
hold that position.  tion  made markets  accessible  within  hours  from
anywhere  in the world. This freed growers  to
This rapid development  has made the cut  shift production  to areas  with favorable  land and
flower  industry  a major  contributor  to the  labor  costs as well as a good giowing climate.
Colombian  economy. Cut flowers  are now  the
nation's leading  nontraditional  export  and fourth  In the United  States,  consumers  have ben-
largest  earner  of foreign  exchange  after coffee,  efited from  the greater  variety,  lower prices,  and
petroleum,  and bananas.  wider availability  of flowers. The U.S. economy
also has benefited  from the employment  opportu-
The industry  also has become  a major  nities created  by the necessity  to handle and care
employer  of low-skill,  largely  female  labor  for the increased  volume  of flowers  at the
drawn  from the low-income  areas  surrounding  wholesale  and retail level.
Bogota. In 1989,  the industry  employed  more
than  70,000 workers  and generated  another
50,000  jobs in such ancillary  industries  as
packaging  and transportation.
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The  Colombian  cut  flowers  industry  is  one  of the  major  development
success  stories  of the  last  two  decades. Although  the industry  scarcely
existed  in 1966,  it soon  developed  into  a  world  class  producer  and  highly
successful  exporter. By 1980  Colombia  was the  world's  second  largest  exporter
of cut flowers  after  the  Netherlands,  accounting  for  8 percent  of the  world
export  supply  of cut  flowers. Today,  ten  years  later,  it  continues  to  hold
that  position.
With its  export  success,  the  Colombian  cut flowers  industry  has  become  a
leading  contributor  to Colombian  economic  development. Cut flowers  are  now
Colombia's  leading  nontraditional  export  and  fourth  largest  earner  of foreign
exchange  behind  coffee,  petroleum,  and  bananas. The  industry  has  also  become
a  major employer  of low-skill,  largely  female  labor  derived  from  the low-
income  areas  surrounding  Bogota. In 1989,  the  industry  employed  over  70,000
workers (70  percent  of  which  were  women)  and  was respinsible  for  another
50,000  jobs in ancillary  industries  such  as packaging  and  transportation.
This employment  effect,  concentrated  in  a small  area,  has  made  a major
contribution  to the  standard  of living  of the  urban  poor.  The industry  also
has symbolic  importance  to Colombians. It is  mostly  owned  by Colombians,  and
its  success  is the  result  of private  entrepreneurship  turning  the  advantages
offered  by Colombia's  climate  and labor  market  into  a commercial  success.
The Colombian  cut flowers  industry's  success  has  also  made it  the target
of protectionist  efforts  in the  United  States,  its  primary  market. U.S.
growers  have tried  to  obtain  limits  on cut  flowers  imports  since  the early
1970s  and  their  efforts  have escalated  rapidly  during  the 1980s. After  twice
failing  to get  escape  clause  protection,  U.S.  growers  have  concentrated  their
efforts  on obtaining  import  relief  under  the  U.S.  unfair  trade  laws. They
have  filed  petitions  under  every  major  provision  of the  unfair  trade  statute.
However,  to date,  no one  appears  to have  been  the  winner  in  these  trade
actic.ns.  U.S.  growers  are  unhappy  because  the  actual  protection  they received
1was  modest  and  much less  than expected. Colombians  are  unhappy  even though
the  modest  size  of the  protection  is a  victory  of sorts. They  note that  it
has come at a sizeable  cost.  They  argue  that the  $1  million  spent  in legal
fees  through  July 1989 (an  amount  similar  to that  of U.S. growers)  could  have
been used  to promote  U.S. flower  consumption  to the  benefit  of all  growers.
A major theme  that  emerges  from  this  study  is that the  development  of
the  Colombian  cut  flowers  industry  is  a textbook  story  of how a  market  economy
works.  Entrepreneurs,  both  Colombian  and  American,  saw  the  opportunities
offered  by changing  economic  circumstances  and  wore  willing  to take  the  risk
of developing  the  new  business  opportunities.  By doing  so,  they  provided
consumers,  particularly  those  in the  United  States,  with greater  variety,
lower  prices  and  much greater  availability  of floral  decorations. This
process  began,  however,  in  North  America  during  the  early  1950.  as the locus
of  production  of the  cut  flowers  industry  shifted  from  the  Eastern  United
States  to  Western  and  Southern  states,  and  then  to Colombia;  the  development
of the  cut  flowers  in Colombia  is simply  an  extension  of this  process.
The  study  proceeds  as follows. Section  II describes  the  evolution  of
the cut  flowers  industry  in the  United  States  beginning  in the  1950.. Section
III  outlines  the factors  that  made  Colombia  an attractive  location  for  cut
flower  production  and  the  role  played  by  American  and  Colombian  entrepreneurs
in making  the  industry  a successful  exporter. The  broad  historical  and
geographic  sweep  of sections  II and  III  serves  to highlight  the similarity  in
the  two  processes. Section  IV  examines  the  role  of Colombian  government
policy. The  story  begins  in 1967  when the  Colombian  government  introduced  a
series  of reforms  designed  to offset  the  disincentives  to exporting. The
implications  of Colombia's  entry  into  the  U.S.  market  are  outlined  in section
V.  This section  reviews  the  history  of  U.S. growers'  efforts  to limit  imports
of  cut flowers.
2Evolution  of  the  U.S.  cut  flowers  industry
In  the  1950o,  U.S.  cut  flowers  production  moved  from  the  Eastern  United
States  to  Florida  and  California.  Two  decades  later,  cut  flowers  production
shifted  to  Colombia.  The  forces  that  led  to  both  movements  were  the  same. In
both  cases,  the  development  of  reliable  air  transportation  freed  cut  flowers
production  from  areas  close  to  major  consuming  markets,  but  with  high  land  and
labor  costs.  Entrepreneurs  saw  the  possibilities  offered  by  these  changes  and
accepted  the  risks  of  developing  new  business  opportunities.  Both  stories  are
textbook  examples  of  how  a  market  economy  works.
A. Dominance  of  Eastern  growers
Once  cut  from  the  plant,  flowers  are  highly  perishable.  :fter  cutting,
roses  last  3  to  5  days,  carnations  7  to  10  days,  standard  chrysanthemums  7  to
12  days,  and  pompon  chrysanthemums  10  to  14  days. Prior  to  1950,  this  high
perishability  was  the  principal  determinant  of  the  location  of  cut  flower
production  in  the  U.S. Since  it  was  important  to  minimize  the  time  between
the  cutting  of  the  flower  and  delivery  to  consumers,  the  first  cut  flowers
producers  in  the  United  States  were  located  in  the  major  consuming  areas  in
the  Northeast,  i.e.  Boston,  Philadelphia,  New  York  (Nelson  1981).
Tte  concentration  of  cut  flower  production  in  the  North  is  illustrated
by  the  data  in  table  1. In  1949,  12,427  establishments  were  engaged  in  the
production  for  sale  of  cut  flowers  and  flowering  plants.I  Of  these,  70
percent  were  located  in  the  Northern  United  States,  with  Pennsylvania  and  New
York  having  the  largest  number  of  producers.  Establishments  in  the  North  also
tended  to  be  smaller,  family-owned  operations.  Their  average  sales  per
establishment  (see  column  three)  were  below  the  average  for  all  regions,  as
well  as  for  the  United  States.
The  only  advantage  in  locating  in  the  Northeast  was  proximity;  in  terms
of  production  costs,  it  was  the  least  desirable  area  for  producing  flowers  in
the  United  States.  Costs  were  higher  for  a  number  of  reasons.
3First,  most commercial  quality  cut  flowers  are  grown  in greenhouses
because  they  require  _sal  growing  ccnditions:  long  days  of sunshine,  high
light  intens2.y,  and  mild temperatures. 2 The less  ideal  the  external
environment,  the  greater  the  cost  of the  greenhouse  since  it  must be  more
airtight,  and  the  higher  its  operating  expenses. Airtight  greenhouses  must be
constructed  of sturdier  materials,  metal  frames  and  glass  rather  than  wood and
cloth  (or  plastic  film). However,  the  Northeast  has shorter  days,  lower  light
intensity,  and  harsher  winters,  particularly  during  the  peak  production
periods. This  means  that  Northern  growers  have  more expensive  greenhouses  and
higher  heating  and  other  fuel  costs.
Second,  cut flowers  production  is one  of the  most labor-intensive
agricultural  activities.  Labor  is required  it nearly  every  aspect  of its
production  and  very few  activities  are  adaptable  to  mechanization. In 1949,
labor  costs  were 45 percent  of total  costs.  (See  table  1.)  Yet labor  has
traditionally  been  most expensive  in the  Northeast.
Finally,  like  all  agricultural  activities,  cut  flowers  production
requires  land. However,  land  values  in the  North  we-e higher  due  to their
proximity  to major  urban -enters.
Production  costs  for  growers  in each  region  are  also  listed  in table  1.
In almost  every  instance,  Northern  growers'  labor,  land,  and  fuel  cost shares
were higher  than those  in other  parts  of the  c -ntry. The  fuel  cost  share  for
Northern  growers  (9.3  percent)  was forty-six  times  that  of Florida  growers,
three  times  that  of Southern  growers,  and  two  times  that  of  Western  growers.
In addition,  the  value  of land,  structures,  and  equipment  per square  foot  was
highest  in  the  North.
Despite  these  higher  production  costs,  Northern  producers  could  continue
to remain  in operation  by charging  a  premium  for  their  flowers. Consumers
were  willing  to  pay this  premium  since  the  flowers  were fresher  and  had  a
longer  shelf  life. The  premium  compensated  Northern  growers  for  higher
production  costs,  much like  a  production  subsidy.
4B.  The  r.se of  Western  and Sc"thern  growers  in the  United  States
The development  of regularly  scheduled  commercial  air  flights  during  the
1950s  eliminated  Eastern  grower's  ability  to charge  a premium  for  freshness.
Air transportation  made it  possib.e  for  flowers  to be  ut and  then transported
to any  location  in the  United  States  within  hours.  Th's  meant  that  producers
could  choose  to locate  in areas  with lower  production  costs. These  low-cost
areas  were largely  in the  West and  South,  where labor  and  land  was  more
abundant  and  where the  climate  was  more favorable. Eastern  markets  thus
opened  up to  Western  growers. Commercial  airlines  also encouraged  western
growers  to sell  flowers  in  the  East (Nelson,  1981). In the  1950s,  most air
cargo  headed  westward  and  planes  were often  empty  on their  return  eastward.
To encourage  eastward  traffic,  the  airlines  offered  lower  air  freight  rates  on
eastbound  cargo.
The  competitive  position  of  Northern  growers  deteriorated.  Already
pressured  by rising  land  and  labor  costs  due  to their  proximity  to urban
areas,  they  now  had to confront  the  price  depressing  effects  from  a greater
availability  of low-cost  Western  flowers. The  effect  on the  U.S.  cut flowers
industry  was dramatic.
U.S.  production  of cut  flowers  began  to shift  away  from  the  high-cost
growing  areas  in the  East  towards  lower-cost  growing  arepe  in  the  West  and
South. The data  in table  2 illustrates  the  shift  in proauction  location.'
Carnations  and  chrysanthemums,  the  more  durable  and  relatively  inexpensive
flowers,  were the first  to shift  production  location. Carnations  shifted
first  to California  and  Colorado,  while  chrysanthemums  moved  to California  and
Florida. Production  of roses  shifted  more slowly.'
The other  major  changes  during  this  period  were in the  size  of
establishments  and  in the  concentration  of industry  output. The  amount  of
output  per establishment  increased,  particularly  in areas  outside  the  North.
The industry  also  became  more concentrated.  In 1975,  a few  firms  accounted
for  the  majority  of output. For  instance,  the  U.S. Department  of  Agriculture
reported  that  25 percent  of the  growers  accounted  for  nearly  75 of the
5production  of  cut  flowers  in  1975,  the  last  year  concantration  data  were
reported.  Thus,  from  the  19509  through  the  mid-1970s,  a few  large
establishments,  particular.y  in  California,  increasingly  displaced  the  small,
family-operated  establishments  in  the  North.
It  is  useful  to  note  that  the  changes  in  the  U.S.  cut  flowers  industry
from  the  1950.  to  the  early  1970s  occurred  prior  to  the  emergence  of  any
import  competition.  The  first  imports  occurred  in  1966,  but  by  1970  their
share  of  the  U.S.  market  was  only 1.1  percent.  We  now  turn  to  the  emergence
of  import  competition.
The rise  of Colombian  growers 5
During  the  late-1960s,  cut  flower  production  shifted  location  to
Colombia.  The  shift  was  an  extension  of  the  regional  shifts  that  had  occurred
in  the  U.S. The  development  of  commercial  air  transportation  opened  up
Colombia's  attractive  environmental  and  labor  conditions  to  flower  growing.
The  shifts  were  so  related  that  one  of  the  first  Colombian  cut  flower
enterprises  was  started  by  four  Americans,  one  of  which  was  a  California
grower  concerned  with  rising  land  and  fuel  costs  in  the  United  States.  Even
the  order  in  which  flower  types  were  introduced  into  Colombia  was  the  same.
Carnations  and  chrysanthemum,  flowers  which  are  sturdier  and  technically  less
demanding  to  produce,  were  introduced  first  and  later  followed  by  roses,  which
are  more  fragile  and  more  complex  to  produce.
A.  The  right  combination  of  factors
Colombia  was  an  ideal  location  for  the  growing  of  cut  flowers.  It  had
near  perfect  environmental  conditions  and  an  abundance  of  le.nd  and  unskilled
labor.  The  climate  in  the  plateau  region  surrounding  Bogota  (Savana  de
Bogota)  has  year-round  moderate  and  unvarying  temperatures,  12-nour  days,  and
high  light  intensity.  As  a  result,  high  quality  flowers  can  be  grown  year-
round  without  expensive  greenhouses  and  without  incurring  costs  for  heating,
6cooling  and  artificial  lighting. For instance,  high-quality  flowers  are  grown
year-round  in the  Bogota  area  in simple  structures  of  wood and  plastic. In
the  Medellin  area,  the  same  structures  are  used  only  to protect  flowers  from
disease  and  heavy  rainfall  during  the  rainy  season.
The ability  to produce  commercial-quality  flowere  year-round  also  mears
that  Colombian  growers  can  continue  to prod"_e  during  the  winter  months  in the
United  States. These  are  the  months  during  which  demand  in  the  United  States
is  greatest  (due  to the  large  number  of holidays),  while  environmental
conditions  ere  least  favovable  for  both  home gardens  and  commercial  growers.6
Two other  factors  made Colombia  an ideal  location  for  growing  flowers.
The  country  is abundantly  endowed  with  naturally  fertile  land,  which  during
the  early  1970s  was being  used  in low-value  activities  (Shypula  1981). More
importantly,  Colombia  also  had an abundance  of low-skilled,  largely  female
labor. This  abundance  meant  that  wage rates  in  Colombia  were significantly
lower  than  comparable  rates  in the  U.S.  This  is illustrated  by the  data
listed  below.
AVERAGE  DAILY  WAGE  FOR  PRODUCTION  WORKERS
Colombia  United  States
Agriculture  Horticulture  Private  Non-
services  agricultural
1966  $.82  $16.03  $19.80
1970  .82  21.25  23.97
Source:  Urrutia  (1985,  10),  USDOL  and  CEA.
This  wage difference  translated  into  a sizeable  cost  advantage  for  Colombian
growers. Using  the  cost  data  in table  1,  the 1970  wage differential  meant
that  Colvmbian  production  costs  were 4!  percent  lower  than  U.S. costs. If the
fuel  cost  savings  are  included,  then  Colombian  production  costs  were 49
percent  lower  than  U.S.  costs. Moreover,  the labor  end fuel  cost  advantages
were not offset  by the  high  cost  of sh.ipping  flowers  to the  United  States.
Even after  factoring  in shipping  costs,  Colombian  production  costa  were still
31 percent  lower  than  U.S.  costs.
Not surprisingly,  these  sizeable  cost  advantages  meant  that the
profitability  of selling  Colombian  flowers  in the  U.S.  market  at U.S.  prices
7was enormously  high.  A 1971  Colombian  government  study  estimated  that  a cut
flower  grower  could  expect  to earn  a  profit  amounting  to 57  percent  of the
sales  value  or a 600  percent  return  per  year on the  initial  investment.'
Another  source  notes  that  "the  cost  of a carnation  in  Colombia  could  be as lo,w
as one  cent  and  the grower  could  sell  it to the  wholesaler  in the  US for  5
cents."  (Riemer  1982,  44-45).  Still  another  source  notes  that  some  margins
were reportedly  100  percent  (Morrow  1989).
Although  the  development  of reliable  air  transportation  opened  up
Colombia's  potential  as a flower  growing  area,  it  was the  cow  4.nation  of two
additional  factors,  occurring  simultaneously,  that  led  to its  development  as a
major  exporter  of the  cut  flowers. The two  key elements  were the
entrepreneurial  efforts  of a team  of four  Americans  and  a  major shift  in
Colombian  government  policy  in 1967. This  team  of  Americans  prcvided  the
right  combination  of skills  to overcome  the  many obstacles  to exporting,  while
the government's  policy  shift  (consistilng  of the  removal  of government-created
burdens)  provided  an environment  in  which  their  efforts  would  be rewarded.
The role  played  by the  Colombian  government's  policy  is outlined  later  in a
separate  section.
In 1969,  Thomas  Kehler,  an  American  businessman,  put together  a team  of
entrepreneurs  to determine  if a flower  export  business  would  be feasible. The
team  consisted  of Harmon  Brown,  the  California  flower  grower  concerned  with
rising  land  and  fuel  prices  in the  United  States;  Bill  Mott, an econotist;
and,  David  Cheever,  who as a university  student  had  used  computer  simulations
to identify  the  Savanah  de Bogota  as ideally  suited  for  the  growing  of
flowers. Following  a feasibility  study,  each  invested  $25,000  and  formed  a
company  called  Floramerica.
The  company  was a  major  success. W- 'in  a short  period  of time,  it
became  one  of the  world's  major  exporters. By 1986,  the company  had  $50
million  in annual  sales  (Rhee  and  Belot  1989).
Although  Floramerica's  success  was dramatic,  its  effect  on the  Colombian
cut  flowers  industry  was even  more so.  In 1970,  Floramerica  accounted  for
8nearly  all of  Colombia's  cut  flowers  exports. However,  by 1986,  the  share
held  by other  Colombian  firms  had  r..sen  to  over 67  percent,  primarily  because
of  the  demonattatioa  effect  of Floramerica's  success  and  due  to the  diffusion
of technological  know-how  from  Floramerica  to other  Colombian  firms. Many
Colombian  companies  copied  their  production  and  marketing  me.!iods,  and often
hired  members  of Floramerica's  staff. David  Cheever,  for  instance,  left
Floramerica  after  two  years  in order  to establish  a consulting  firm  to  help
new flower  companies,  and  two  members  of Sunburst  Farms,  Floramerica's
brokerage  off'ice  in  Miami,  left  to set  up their  own  brokerage  firm.  This  new
firm,  called  Colombia  Floral  Exchange,  is  now  the second  largest  importer  of
flowers  behind  Sunburst  Farms. In sum,  Floramerica  was directly  responsible
for  the  development  of the  Colombian  cut flowers  industry  (Rhee  and  Belot
1989).
B.  Overcoming  obstacles
Despite  the significant  advantages  of growing  flowers  in Colombia,
serious  obstacles  stJll  remained  to  be overcome  before  the  flowers  could  be
exported  profitably. The  most important  problem  dealt  with the  handling  and
.. ransport  of the  flowers. Growers  had  to ftad  a  way to efficiently  handle  and
transport  them  from  Colombia  to the  U.S.
Many early  shipments  of cut  flowers  were destroyed  in the  heat  while
waiting  to 5)e  loaded  onto  planes  or to be inspected  by customs  officisls.
Avianca,  the  major  carrier,  behaved  as  a monopolist  unconcerned  with being
responsive  to cut flowers  growers. It refused  to  make special  provisions  for
handling  the  flowers. It considered  them  secondary  to the trarLzport  of
passengers,  and  shipped  them  in regularly  scheduled  passenger  flights  stored
with the  passengers'  luggage. To solve  this  problem,  Floramerica  and  another
company,  Jardines  de los  Andes,  encouraged  other  airlines  to enter  into  the
business  of shipping  cut flowers. The  first  company  to do so,  Aerocosta
failed,  and  Floramerica  and  Jardines  de los  Andes  were left  were left
scrambling  for a carrier  for  months  since  Avianca  refused  to carry  their
9flowers. Later,  growers  did  convince  Avianca  to  handle  flowers  at night  and
to purchase  several  freighters  to transport  them.  Other  companies  also
entered  into  the  business  of shipping  cut  flowers.
Colombian  growers  were also instrumental  in the  development  of
sophisticated  receiv  .ag  and distribution  facilities  in  Miami.  Through  their
association  (ASOCOLFLORES),  Colombian  growers  helped  form  a  common  handling
company  in  Miami.  This company,  called  Transcold,  would  unload  the flowers
into  refrigerated  storage  areas  and  have them  ready  for  customs  inspections
prior  to their  shipment  to  wholesalers.
Another  major step  taken  by Colombian  growers,  such  as Floramerica,  was
to establish  wtiolly  owned  importer-distributor  companies  in  Miami  and  later  in
Europe. This  allowed  them  to eliminate  third  party  brokerage  houses  and  to
control  the  marketing  of their  products. It also  made it easier  to stay
abreast  of  market  developments.  Today,  there  are  more than 100  importers-
distributors  of cut  flowers  in  Miami.  In 1988,  the  industry  had  more than
2,000  employees  and,  in 1987,  had a  payroll  of about  $28  million. 8 These
facilities  handle  over  90 percent  of the  imports  entering  the  United  States
from  Latin  America.
Colombian  growers  faced  virtually  nc problems  with distributing  flowers
throughout  the  United  States,  particularly  in  the eastern  states. Growers
tapped  into  an already  established  system. A trucking  company,  Armellini,  had
originally  handled  the  shipping  of Florida-produced  chrysanthemums  to  major
consuming  markets  in the  Northeast. Armellini  guaranteed  delivery  to Eastern
markets  within  two  days.  The  existence  of this  distribution  system,  combined
with the  greater  density  and  purchases  of  buyers  along  the  shipping  routes,
meant  that  the  transportation  costs  of selling  Colombian  flowers  in Eastern
markets  was below  that  of flowers  shipped  from  the  West coast  (Morrow  1989).
Once the  impediments  to shipping  cut  flowers  from  Colombia  were
overcome,  Colombia's  exports  grew  dramatically.  Exports  to its  primary
market,  the  United  States,  grew  at a phenomenal  rate;  for  instance,  in 1973,
10they  grew  374  percent.  (See  table  3, column  7.)  By 1980,  the  industry  had
become  the  world's  second  largest  exporter  of cut  flowers.
Equally  as impressive  was the  short  time  it took  the  industry  to become
the  United  States'  leading  supplier  of foreign  cut  flowers. In 1974,
Colombian  growers  accounted  for  over  83 percent  of all  U.S. imports  of cut
flowers  and  its  share  of U.S.  imports  was even  larger  for  certain  flower
typess 93 percent  of imported  carnations  and  pompon  chrysanthemums  came  from
Colombia. Later,  the industry  also  captured  a large  share  of the  U.S.  market.
Measured  in dollars,  Colombia  accounted  fo-  25  percent  of the  U.S.  cut  flowers
market  in 1988. However,  measured  in  units,  Colombians  accounted  for  67
percent  of all  carnations,  65 percent  of all  pompon  chrysanthemums,  and  25
percent  of all  roses  sold  in the  U.S.
Colombia's  entry  into  the  U.S.  cut  flowers  market  has turned  into  a
major  source  of benefits  for  U.S.  consumers. These  benefits  have come in  the
forr  of lower  prices,  increased  variety,  greater  year-round  availability,  and
increased  access  through  nontraditional  outlets.
The  greater  year-round  availability  of foreign  cut  flowers  has  been
especially  beneficial  to  U.S.  consumers  because  of the  nature  of U.S.  demand.
Imports  of cut flowers  have  helped  limit  the  sharp  increases  in  prices  that
result  during  the  peak  demand-low  domestic  supply  periods. These  lower  prices
have in  turn  fueled  U.S.  consumers'  demand  for  cut  flowers.
Low-price  imports  have  also  benefited  U.S.  consumers  by transforming  the
marketing  of cut flowers  in  the  United  States.  The  increased  year-round
availability  of low-cost  cut flowers  has  reduced  the  costs  and  risks
associated  with holding  large  inventories  of flowers. This  in turn  has  made
it  practical  for flowers  to be sold  by nontraditional  or non-florist  outlets
such  as supermarkets  and street  vendors. Krogers,  for  example,  one  of the
first  high-volume  sales  outlets  to sell  flowers,  only  opened  its  first  flower
department  in 1978. But,  by 1986,  760  of its  1,351  stores  were selling  cut
flowers. Moreover,  other  major  chains  had followed  its  lead. For instance,
in 1986,  all  of Safeway's  1,351  stores  had  a self-service  floral  department.
11Thus,  while  only 13  percent  of  U.S. supermarkets  had  handled  flowers  in 1977
(Morrow  1989),  that  number  had risen  to 86  percent  in  1986.9
These  marketing  changes  have further  fueled  consumer  demand. They  have
done  so  not only  by  making  inexpensive  cut  flowers  more readily  available,  but
also  by creating  a greater  awareness  of cut  flowers  among  consumers  and  by
changing  consumers'  perception  that flowers  are  a luxury  good  available  only
in  high-cost  specialty  stores. Yet,  even  traditional  outlets,  such  as florist
shops,  have  benefited  from  the  increased  availability  of low-cost  imports  and
the  accompanying  expansion  in consumer  demand. Although  their  share  of retail
sales  has declined  over  the  last  two  decades,  the  surge  in consumer  demand  has
led  to an increase  in their  number. In 1963,  there  were 20,000  flower  shops.
By 1988,  that  number  had  grown  to 36,200.
In addition  to providing  benefits  to U.S.  consumers,  low-cost  flower
imports  have  created  employment  opportunities  in the  U.S.  economy,
particularly  at the  retail  and  wholesale  level. At the  retail  level,  grocery
stores  have increased  the  demand  for  workers  to care  for  and  stock  the  new
floral  departments.  At the  wholesale  level,  there  has been  an increased
demand  for  workers  to handle  the  increased  volume  of flowers. These
employment  gains  are  in addition  to those  gains  noted  among  Miami  importer-
distributors.
C.  Recent  developments
Colombian  exporters  have developed  into  a  world  class,  largely  Colombian
owned  industry. Over 400  firms  have an  estimated  3,571  hectares  under
cultivation. As it did  in the  beginning,  the  industry  continues  to export  the
majority  of its  output  (between  90 and  95  percent),  with the  United  States
accounting  for  80 to 85 percent  of total  sales. However,  it  has lessened  its
dependence  on carnations  and  now  produces  more than  30  varieties  of cut
flowers.'°  Roses  are  its  fastest  growing  export.
Like the  U.S.  cut flowers  industry,  there  are  several  large,  efficient
firms. However,  concentration  is low  and the  market  is competitive  due  to the
12ease of entry  into  the  industry. According  to  Morrow  (1989),  in 1981,  the 10
largest  companies  held 50 percent  of the  land  in cut flower  production,  which
is a low concentration  ratio. By 1990,  preliminary  data shows  this  share  had
fallen  to less  than 42  percent.
The industry  is also  a  major  employer  of low  and  semi-skilled  labor,
particularly  female  labor  from  the  low-income  areas  surrounding  Bogota. It is
estimated  that the  industry  employs  70,000  directly  and  50,000  in  ancillary
activities.
D.  Future  Problems
Colombian  growers  should  continue  to maintain  a dominant  position  in the
U.S.  market."  However,  they  do face  three  uncertainties. First,
competition  in the  U.S.  market  is likely  to  become  even  stiffer. Rising  land
and labor  costs  within  Colombia  are  eroding  Colombian  growers'  cost  advantage
relative  to flower  producers  in other  developing  countries  in Latin  America
(Shypula  1981). The  other  two  major  concerns  for  the  industry  are  the  up-and-
down  Colombian  government  policies  and  protectionist  efforts  in  the  United
States. These  issues  are  the  subject  of the  next two  sections.
The  up-and-down  Colombian  government  policies
No specially  tailored  Colombian  government  program  contributed  to the
success  of Colombian  growers. Indeed,  growers  rejected  the  government's
attempt  to  have an active  role  in  assisting  the  industry  (Ceballos  1977).
However,  the  Colombian  government's  up-and-down  policies  have affected  the
industry's  performance. Colombian  growers  benefited  in the  early  years  when
the  government  took  steps  to  undo policies  that  were unfavorable  to  business
activity. However,  the  government  later  returned  to these  unfavorable
policies,  and  the  Colombian  cut  flowers  industry  survived  despite  the
government. The  ups and  downs  of  Colombian  government  policy  are  described
13below in sections  A through  C.  Section  D describes  policies  that  were
specific  to the  Colombian  cut flowers  industry.
A.  The  undoing  of a  bad  policy
In 1967,  the  Colombian  government  took  steps  to  undo the  negative
effects  of a three-decade  old  anti-trade  policy. Like other  Latin  American
countries,  Colombia  had  followed  an Import-Substitution-Industrialization
strategy. The strategy  was implemented  by a reotrictive  import  policy,  which
resulted  in a consistently  overvalued  peso.  Both  the import  policy  and  the
overvalued  peso  discouraged  exporters. The  restrictive  trade  policy  made it
more profitable  to  produce  for  the  home  market  than  to export,  whereas  the
overvalued  peso hurt  exporters  by  making  Colombian  products  more expensive
abroad.
The government  first  took  steps  to provide  a business  climate  that  did
not discriminate  against  exporters. First,  it reduced  the  profitability  of
producing  for  the  home  market. Beginning  in 1967  and  through  the  end  of 1973,
the government  relaxed  import  restrictions." 2 Second,  and  most importantly,
the  government  was  permitted  to  devalue  the  peso  periodically  to  prevent  it
from  becoming  overvalued.  This  effectively  established  a  crawling  peg.  The
peso-dollar  real exchange  rate  index  is listed  in  column  4 in  table  4.  It
shows  that from  1967  to 1970,  the  government  used  the  crawling  peg  to
successfully  devalue  the  peso.  The  real  exchange  rate  was  then  maintained
reasonably  constant  up until  1972.  The  significance  of  this  action  cannot  be
overstated. This  was the  first  time  since  1957-58  that  the  exchange  rate  had
depreciated  in  two  consecutive  years  (Hutcheson  and  Schydlowsky  1982,  126).
This  was the  most important  of the  changes  made  by the  government  to eliminate
the  discrimination  against  exports.
Although  the  government  lowered  import  barriers,  import  protection
continued  to remain  (and  still  does  in 1990)  at high le7els. To undo the
negative  effects  of this  policy  on exports,  the  government  also  implemented
several  export  promotion  measures. First,  the  government  replaced  an existing
14tax  credit  certificate  for  nontraditional  exporters  (those  exporting  products
other  than  coffee,  bananas,  petroleum  and  cattle  hides)  with the  Certificado
de  Abon3  Tributario  (CAT). Unlike  the  previous  certificate,  the  CAT could
used  to pay  most taxes  and  was not limited  to income  tax liability." Table
4 lists  the  various  rates  for  the  CAT,  which  was initially  set  at 15  percent
of the  fob (free-on-board)  export  value.  Second,  the government  created  an
export  promotion  agency  and fund,  both  referred  to as PROEXPO  (Fondo  de
Promocion  de Exportaciones).  PROEXPO  provided  promotional  services  (trade
fairs,  market  studies,  etc.)  and  subsidized  export  credits. The credits
consisted  of short-term  loans  for  working  capital,  and, to a lesser  extent,
medium-  and  long-term  loans  for  capital  assets. Data on  PROEXPO  subsidies  is
less  readily  available,  but  Thoumi  (1981,  148)  notes  that  the  subsidy  was
raised  to 20 percent  fob  export  value  in 1972. Lastly,  the  government  relaxed
the  restrictions  on the  use  of the  Plan  Vallejo,  which  allowed  the  duty-free
import  of inputs  used in exported  products.
The  government's  removal  of the  bias against  exports  led  to dramatic
results." Nontraditional  exports  experienced  an 'export  boom'  between  1967
and 1974. Their  average  annual  growth  rate  during  this  period  was over  three
times  that of traditional  exports  (28.6  percent  versus  8.6  percent). Their
value (in  current  prices)  increased  over  500  percent,  from  $113  million  in
1967  to $678  million  in 1974. The  value  of traditional  exports,  on the  other
hand,  increased  only  86 percent  over  the  same  period,  rising  from $397  million
to $738  million.' 5 Exports  of cut  flowers  also  increased  dramatically.
B.  The  return  of a bad  policy
In a series  of actions  from 1973  to 1982,  the  Colombian  government  began
to back away  from  its  efforts  to undo  the  policies  that  had  discriminated
against  exports. The  policy  reversal  occurred  as the  government  attempted  to
address  other  economic  problems. To begin  with,  the  rates  of devaluation  were
reduced  and  the  peso  allowed  to increased  in  value  in order  to stem inflation.
As a consequence,  the  real  exchange  rate  appreciated  continuously  from  1975  to
151981.  By 1978,  it  had fallen  below  the  1967  levell  (See  table  4.)
Similarly,  the  CAT  program  was altered  and  the  rates  reduced  in response  to
budgetary  problems. The  completion  of the  unraveling  of the  policy  occurred
in 1982,  when import  restraints  were tightened  sharply."'  The  government
increased  import  restrictions  in order  to  address  a current  account  imbalance
caused  in  part by  mismanaged  macroeconomic  policies.
Not surprisingly,  the  results  were disastrous  for  nontraditional
exports. After  growing  5 percent  a  year in  real  terms  during  1970-75,  their
annual  growth  fell  to only  2 percent  during  1975-82  (Thomas  1982,  33). There
was even  a decline  in  the  exports  of products  in  which  Colombia  had a
comparative  advantage. The  rate  of growth  of  cut  flower  exports  also  declined
sharply  during  this  period  (see  column  8 in table  3).
C. Another  attempt  to  undo  a bad  policy
In 1984,  the  Colombian  government  once  again  took  steps  to  undo its
discriminatory  policy  against  exporters. It recognized  that  to restore  the
international  competitiveness  of its  exports,  it  would  have  to lower  the  value
of the  peso,  which  had increased  steadily  for  seven-years.  Table  4 shows  that
the  government  sharply  devalued  the  exchange  rate  beginning  in 1984. Relative
to its 1983  value,  the  nominal  exchange  rate  was devalued  over  279  percent,
while  the real  exchange  rate  was devalued  66  percent. The  government  also
reduced  import  restrictions.
Although  exports  responded  favorably,  problems  remain. The import
regime  has  become  only  slightly  less  protectionist  and  remains  "more  closed
than  before  ...  [the  1982-83  period]." (Laird  and  Nogues  1989). Without  more
substantial  trade  liberalization,  the  economy  is expected  to have  less  than
stellar  economic  growth  rates  for  many  years  to come.
D.  Policies  speciflc  to the  cut  flowers  industry
Like other  nontraditional  exporters,  cut  flower  growers  have  been
affected  ty the  Colombian  government's  broad  economic  policies:  the  removal  of
16obstacles  in 1967  contributed  to their  success,  while the  policy  reversals  of
the  mid-1970s  and  early  1980s  have  hindered  them. However,  cut  flower
growers'  experience  does  differ  in one  major  respect. Beginning  in the  mid-
1970s  and  particularly  during  the 1980s,  they  have received  little  or no
ben-fits  from  the  CAT,  PROEXPO  subsidies  and  the  Plan  Vallejo.
Table  4 lists  the  CAT (or  CERT)  rates  for  the  cut  flowers  industry  from
1967  to 1988.  Since  the  mid-1970s,  the  CAT  rate  has been  insufficient  to
compensate  for  the  high  value  of the  peso.  It  has  been set  at zero  percent  or
at a  modest  level. During  the 1980s,  the  cut  flowers  industry  received  meager
levels  of support  from  PROEXPO. This  is supported  by the  small  gross  subsidy
estimates  developed  by the  U.S.  Department  of Commerce  (DOC)  in two
countervailing  duty (CVD)  investigations  conduzted  during  this  period."  The
DOC  determined  that  subsidized  interest  rates  on short-  and long-term  loans
had  conferred,  respectively,  gross  subsidies  of .436  percent  ad  valorem  and
.219  percent  ad  valorem  (51  PR 37934). The  DOC also  found  that  Colombian
producers  of  miniature  carnations  had  used  the  Plan  Vallejo  to exempt  duties
on imports  of  machinery  used  to sort  carnations.  The  DOC  estimate  of the
gross  benefits  was .439  percent  ad  valorem.as  In  both of these  CVD  cases,
the  U.S. governent  did  not  impose  countervailing  duties,  because  Colombian
growers  quickly  surrendered  the  benefits  from  the  programs.
E.  Implications  for  Colombian  policy
This  review  of the  Colombian  government's  general  economic  policies
shows  that  their  up-and-down  nature  has affected  Colombia's  cut flowers
industry. The industry  did  benefit  in the  early  years  from  the  government's
efforts  to  undo  policies  that  burdened  exporters. However,  the  government
later  returned  to these  unfavorable  policies. Overall,  the  government's
general  economic  policies  have  been  a  barden  on cut  flower  growers. They  have
survived  despite  the  government.
Colombian  cut flower  growers  have  also  been  burdened  by the  government's
use  of export-promotion  measures  (the  CAT,  PROEXPO  subsidies,  and  the  Plan
17Vallejo). These  measures  were designed  to give  back  what other  policies  take
away.  Although  Colombian  cut  flower  growers  have received  minimal  benefits
from  these  pLograms,  particularly  in the 1980s,  the  existe-..e  of these
programs  has served  as the  basis  for  U.S.  growers'  use of the  CVD  laws to
limit  imports  of Colombian  cut flowers. The  next section  describes  these  and
other  trade  actions  initiated  by U.S.  growers  against  Colombian  cut  flower
growers.
U.S. growers  efforts  to limit  cut flower  imports
The entry  of Colombian  flowers  into  the  U.S.  market  in the  early  19709
intensified  the  adjustment  process  that  had  begun  in the  19509  and  also
altered  its  character. Earlier,  Western  and Southern  growers  had  pressured
Eastern  growers. Now,  it  was Colombians  who  were pressuring  Eastern  growers
and  challenging  Western  and Southern  growers  for the  Eastern  market. The
emergence  of this  competition  could  not  have  come  at a  worse time  for  U.S.
growers. The  oil-crisis  of 1973-74  had  caused  a  sharp  rise  in  U.S. growers'
operating  costs. At the  same  time,  Western  and  Southern  growers  were
beginning  to experience  some  of the same  pressures  that  Eastern  growers  had
begun  to face  earliers  rising  land  costs  due  to urbanization.  Faced  with
these  pressures,  U.S.  growers  responded  by seeking  import  protection. The
next two  sections  review  the  efforts  to limit  imports  and  describe  their
effects  on Colombian  exporters.
A.  Summary  of  trade  actions
The  trade  actions  against  U.S. imports  of cut flowers  are  summarized  in
table  5.  These  actions  fall  into  two  broad  periods. The first  durir.g  the
1970s  and  the second  during  the  19809.
During  the first  period,  U.S.  growers  were primarily  concerned  with
limiting  all imports,  regardless  of  whether  or not they  were fairly  or
unfairly  traded." The domestic  industry  filed  two escape  petitions,  the
18first  in 1977  directed  at all  cut  flower  imports  and  the second  in 1979
limited  to rose imports. Although  escape  clause  cases  do not  target  specific
countries,  the  trade  action  was effectively  directed  at Colombian  exports
since  they  accouated  for  over  89  percent  of total  imports  in 1976  and 77
percent  of rose imports  in 1979.
Both  escape  clause  cases  failed. In the  first  case,  the  ITC found  that
U.S. growers'  difficulties  stemmed  from  problems  created  by the  oil-price
increase  of 1973-74. The  subsequent  rise  in energy  prices  hurt  domestic
growers  by causing  shal:  'ncreases  in their  operating  costs. At the same
time,  the 1974-75  recession,  also  caused  by the  oil  crisis,  led  to a collapse
in cut  flower  demand. In the  second  case,  the  ITC  concluded  that  the industry
was healthy  and that  imports  were  not causing  serious  injury  to the  domestic
industry.
The  second  period  begins  early  in the 1980s  and  includes  the  vast
majority  of individual  trade  actions. Motivated  by their  failure  to obtain
escape  clause  protection  during  the 19709,  domestic  growers  turned  to the  use
of the  unfair  trade  laws  as their  vehicle  for  obtaining  protection. They
requested  investigations  under  all  the  major  provisions  of the  unfair  trade
mechanism:  antisub  tdy  (CVD),  antidumping  (AD),  end  unfair  trade  practices.
Like the earlier  p-iod,  the  majority  (90  percent)  of the  imports  targeted  by
unfair  trade  petitions,  were Colombian.
From 1980  to 1985,  U.S.  growers  were cpncerned  with limiting  imports  of
roses,  largely  Colombian. Their  efforts  met  with limited  success. The  only
important  success  was a CVD  case  against  Colombian  exporters  of all  cut
flowers,  except  miniature  carnations. The  DOC  detesmined  that  Colombian
exporters  were receiving  benefits  of 4 to 5  percent  ad  valorem  under  a new  CAT
program. But, as in 1974,  no countervailing  duties  were applied  since
Colombian  growers  agreed  not  to  use the  program. Based  on 1985  trade  flows,
the agreement  covered  over  96 percent  of Colombian  exports  or 57 percent  of
total  U.S. imports.
19From  May 1986  to the  present,  domestic  growers  switched  strategy. Given
their  limited  success  in obtaining  protection  for  rose  growers,  they turned
their  efforts  to seeking  protection  for  those  segments  of the industry  in
which import  competition  was  more intense. In 1986,  they  made  a mass filing
of  AD and  CVD  petitions. They  filed  against  ten  countries  (Canada,  Chile,
Colombia,  Costa  Rica,  Ecuador,  Israel,  Kenya,  Mexico,  the  Netherlands,  and
Peru),  and their  exports  to the  U.S.  of seven  flower  types (standard  and
miniature  carnations,  standard  and  pompon  chrysanthemums,  alstroemeria,
gerberas,  and  gypsophila). The  petitions  covered  over 98  percent  of the
imports  of these  flowers;  all  together,  they  represented  45  percent  of total
1985  cut flower  imports. 20 The  sweeping  nature  of these  filings  --  targeting
all  suppliers  of a particular  flower  --  indicates  that  domestic  growers  were,
as in the  1970s,  still  seeking  relief  from  import  competition  in general.
The  mass filing  of petitions  was generally  a success. The  DOC
determined  that  all seven  flower  types  had  been  dumped  or subsidized.
However,  what  was  more important  was that  the  ITC  made favorable  injury
decisions. It concluded  that imports  of standard  and  miniature  carnations,
and  standard  and  pompon  chrysanthemums,  which  represented  the  bulk  of targeted
imports,  had  caused  injury  to the  domestic  industry.
What accounts  for  the  favorable  injury  decisions? A key  element  was the
ITC  majority's  use of  a narrow  industry  definition. Experience  shows  that  the
narrower  the industry  is defined,  the  greater  the  chance  of an  affirmative
injury  decision. It is easier  for  a segment  of the industry  to show  injury
even  though  the  entire  industry  is  healthy.
Table  6 shows  data on four  performance  indicators  for  the  domestic
industry,  which are  generally  good  predictors  of the  ITC's  injury  decision.
All three  indicators  fell  for  standard  carnations  and standard  chrysanthemums.
Two  of the  three  fell  for  pompon  chrysanthemums.  Only one  indicator  fell  for
miniature  carnations,  and  it (a  measure  of profits)  remained  at a high level.
Based  in  part  on these  data,  the  ITC  majority  determined  that  all  producers,
except  those  of  miniature  carnations,  had  been injured. Had the  ITC  adopted  a
20broad  definition  of the  industry,  then  their  decision,  like  that  of the  ITC
minority,  would  have  been  based  on the  aggregate  data  listed  in the  bottom  of
the  table. The first  three  indicators  trended  upwards  for  the  industry  as a
whole,  and  while  the  fourth  trended  downwards,  members  of the  ITC  minority
argued  that  this  was due  to the inclusion  of increased  expenditures  for
capital  and  research  and  development  within  the  financial  data.  Thus,  the  use
of a  broad  industry  definition  would  have led  the  ITC  to conclude  that  the
industry  was healthy  and  not injured  by unfair  imports.
Have these  affirmative  decisions  translated  into  actual  protection  for
U.S. growers? No.  The  protective  effect  of the  mass filings  has  been  modest,
despite  the  imposition  of dumping  and  countervailing  duties. Consider  the
case  of Colombia  which  accounts  for  nearly  all  of the  imports  affected  by CVD
and  AD rulings. In the  CVD  case,  the  DOC ruled  that  a 1.09  percent  ad  valorem
duty  be applied  to imports  of  miniature  carnations  from  Colombia. (Miniature
carnations  had  been excluded  from  the  earlier  CVD case  filed  against  roses  and
other  cut  flowers.) However,  like  all  previous  CVD  cases,  Colombian  growers
quickly  surrendered  any  benefits  and  the  U.S.  government  did  not  apply
countervailing  duties. In the  AD cases,  Colombian  imports  of carnations  and
chrysanthemums  were assessed  dumping  duties  of 3.53  percent  ad  valorem. These
duties,  while  troublesome,  are  not onerous. They  also do  not support  U.S.
growers'  claims  that  Colombia's  market  dominance  is based  on unfair  trade,
particularly  since  the  DOC's  methodology  biases  dumping  margin  calculations
upwards.
B.  No  winners
No one  appears  to have  been  the  winner  in these  trade  actions. Although
U.S. growers  used the  unfair  trade  laws  until  they  obtained  affirmative  injury
decisions,  the  actual  protection  they  received  was  modest  and certainly  much
less  than  they  expected. Similarly,  even though  the  trade  sanctions  imposed
on Colombians  were  modest,  the  litigation  and  other  unmeasurable  costs  have
been significant.
21Domestic  growers  have  given  several  indications  that  they  are
dissatisfied  with  the  results  of  the  unfair  trade  cases.  Domestic  rose
growers  were  successful  in  having  a  provision  included  in  the  Omnibus  Trade
Act  of  1988,  requesting  that  the  ITC  conduct  a  study  on  the  international
competitiveness  of  the  domestic  rose  industry.  These  studies  are  often  used
like  'fishing  expeditions'  to  determine  if  the  industry  can  lav  the  basis  for
filing  a  trade  petition  or  pressuring  the  administration  to  negotiate
voluntary  restraint  agreements.
Domestic  growers  have  also  begun  to  argue  that  the  industry  is  still
threatened  by  imports  and  that  quotas  are  required.  In  commenting  on  the
DOC's  recalculation  of  the  dumping  duties,  the  president  of  the  Floral  Trade
Council,  Arne  Thirup,  stated:
This  indicates  there  is  still  an  oversupply  of  cut  flowers  being
shipped  to  the  U.S.  markets  and  althougn  tnis  is  a  new  victory  for
fresh  cut  flower  growers  in  the  United  States,  it  is  obvious  we
need  additional  answers...  Too  many  American  growers  have  been
forced  out  of  business  by  these  illegal  tactics.  We in  the
industry  feel  we  must  have  some  kind  of  quota  on  imported  cut
flowers  to  allow  us  to  compete  on  a  level  playing  field.
(Florists'  Review,  March  1990.)
Like  U.S.  groweros  Colombians  are  also  unhappy  with  the  results  of  this
process.  They  note  that,  even  as  measured  by  the  DOC,  the  dumping  and  subsidy
rates  have  been  modest. 21 Yet,  the  litigation  and  other  unmeasurable  costs
borne  by  Colombians  have  been  substantial.  These  c-sts,  coupled  with  the
dumping  duties,  have  caused  Colombians  to  lose  profits  and  sales  in  the  U.S.
market. Supply  and  demand  conditions  limit  their  ability  to  pass  on  the
dumping  duties  to  U.S.  consumers.  On  the  supply  side,  the  price  is  set
competitively  due  to  the  large  number  of  competing  producers.  Even  though
Colombia  is  the  world's  second  largest  exporter,  its  world  export  share  is
only  8  percent.  On  the  demand  side,  price  increases  are  limited  by  U.S.
consumer's  high  sensitivity  to  price  changes.  U.S.  consumers  are  highly
likely  to  substitute  other  flower  types  in  arrangements  or  to  postpone
purchases  in  response  to  price  increases.
22The  uncertainty  generated  among  importers  and  wholesalers  of Colombian
cut  flowers  is less  easily  quantified,  but is  also a source  of lost  sales.
These  buyers  are  generally  reluctant  to purchase  a  product  under  investigation
since  the investigation  generates  uncertainty  over  i.s  likely  availability  and
price. This cost  should  not  be dismissed  since  over  98 percent  of Colombian
exports  to the  U.S.  have  been  subjected  to this  type  of uncertainty.
U.S.  antidumping  laws  may  also  have  caused  Colombians  to lose  sales  in
the  European  market. It is argued  that  Colombians  are limiting  their  exports
to Europe  (under  5 percent  of their  total  export  sales)  in order  to avoid
having  the  prices  of those  sales  used in  calculating  dumping  margins. 2a
According  to U.S. trade  law,  dumping  margins  may  be calculated  by comparing
U.S.  sales  prices  with the  prices  of sales  in  markets  accounting  for  over  5
percent  of total  exports.
In addition  to lost  sales,  growers  point  to other  types  of costs
incurred  due  to the  unfair  trade  cases. They  note  that  one  estimate  of the
litigation  costs  through  July 1989  placed  them  at $1  million  for  Colombian
growers  (an  amount  similar  to that  of U.S.  growers). 23 Growers  also  complain
that  they  must devote  countless  man-hours  to the  trade  cases  and to  meeting
the demands  for  data  by the  DOC. This is  time  spent  away from  the  business.
Finally,  Colombian  growers  note  with some  irony  that  U.S. growers'
efforts  to restrict  imports  may have  had the  unintended  consequence  of
encouraging  the  spread  of cut  flower  production  to even  more countries,
thereby  increasing  the  number  of potential  competitors.  As noted  earlier,  it
appears  that  the  cut flowers  industry  is  now  extending  beyond  Colombia. Like
the  production  shifts  in the  United  States,  rising  land  and labor  costs  within
Colombia  are  causing  a shift  in flower  production  to other  developing
countries  in  Latin  America. U.S.  protectionist  efforts  may  have increased  the
rate  at  which  the  cut  flower  production  spreads  to these  other  countries.
Many of the  new  farms  established  in these  countries  are  owned  by Colombian
growers  or are  the  product  of Colombian  technical  expertise  that  has  lien  sold
to local  entrepreneurs.  Colombian  growers  have indicated  that  one  reason  for
23shifting  their  investment  from  Colombia  to these  new areas  is the  desire  to
export  from  production  sites  that  are  not  under  the  shadow  of the  unfair  trade
mechanism. 24
C.  Closing  comment  on  the  antidumping  law
Economists  have long  pointed  out  that  antidumping  laws  often  penalize
actions  that  are  economically  efficient  and  which  benefit  consumers  by
promoting  greater  competition. Their  application  to producers  in  markets,
like  cut flowers,  which are  characterized  by demand  peaks  provides  another
example. 2'  Economic  analysis  shows  that  producers  in there  types  of  markets
should  engage  in  what is called  peak-load  pricing:  prices  should  be set  below
full  cost  during  slack  periods  and  above  cost  during  the  high demand  periods.
By doing  so,  firms  earn  just  enough  profits  to stay  in business. This
increases  competition  and  leads  to lower  consumer  prices  over  the long-run.
However,  the  antidumping  laws  discourage  this  type  of pricing  behavior.
Conclusion
This study  has  reviewed  the  origins  of cut  flower  production  in
Colombia. It has  shown  that  the  industry's  development  is a product  of the
same  forces  that led  to  the  movement  of cut  flower  production  from  the  Eastern
United  States  to the  Western  and  Southern  United  States. In both  cases,  tue
development  of air  transportation  made  markets  accessible  within  hours  from
anywhere  in the  world.  This freed  growers  to shift  production  to areas  with
more favorable  climate  and  land  and  labor  coats. Production  moved  first  to
the  Western  and  Southern  United  States  and then  to Colombia.
The shift  of  production  to Colombia  has spread  benefits  all  around. In
Colombia,  the  industry  has  become  the  primary  employer  of the  poor,  low-skill
workers  who live  in the  slum  areas  surrounding  Bogota. In America,  consumers
have  benefited  from  the  greater  variety,  lower  prices  and  much greater
availability  of floral  decorations.  They  have also  benefited  from  a dramatic
24transformation  in  the  marketing  of cut  flowers. Flowers  are  now  widely
available  in supermarkets  and other  nontraditional  outlets. This  has led  to a
greater  awareness  of flowers  among  U.S.  consumers  and  to a change  in the
perception  that flowers  are  a luxury  good  available  only in  high-cost
specialty  stores. The  U.S.  economy  has  also  benefited  from  the  employment
opportunities  created  by the  necessity  of  handling  and  caring  for  the
increased  volume  of flowers  both at  the  wholesale  and retail  level. The story
is an outstanding  example  of  what is good  about  the  market  system  --  an
illustration  of  why the  market  system  is the  most  effective  way for  a society
to coordinate  its  economic  activities.
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26Notes
1. These  establisbments  had  total  sales  of $219  million,  of  which  56.6  percent
represented  sales  of cut  flowers. Four  crops  accounted  for  55  percent  of total
cut  flowers  sold  in the  U.S.:  roses ($30.6  million),  carnations  ($20  million),
pompons  ($10.4  million),  and standard  chrysanthemums  ($7.3  million).
2.  In  1949, few  commercial quality cut  flowers were  grown outside of
greenhouses. Only 1.3  percent  of the  total  sales  of the  four  major  cut-flower
crops  (carnations,  roses,  and  pompon  and standard  chrysanthemums)  were derived
from  crops  grown  outdoors  or under  lath.
3.  Although  these  data are presented  in percentage  terms,  production  levels
reveal  the  same  trend. The same  trade  is  also revealed  for  other  flower  types
and  using  total  wholesale  value  of  production  and  the  number  of producers.
4.  This  pattern  is a  portend  of  future  changes. Carnations  and  chrysanthemums
were the  first  flowers  to  shift  production  to  Colombia  in  the  late  1960.. Roses,
which  are  more fragile  and  technically  more demanding  to  produce,  shifted  later
only  after  Colombians  had gained  experience  growing  other  cut  flowers.
5. This  section  has  benefited  greatly  from  a  set  of detailed  comments  submitted
by  Mr. Pablo  Felipe  Uribe,  ASOCOLFLORES  and  the  following  studies: Austin  and
Encinales  (1978),  Rhee and  Belot (1989),  and  Morrow  (1989).
6.  The five major flower-selling  holidays are Valentine's  days, Easter,
Christmas,  Secretary's  Week and  Mother's  Day.
7.  The study indicated  that  with an investment  of $90,387,  a Colombian  cut
flower  grower  could  expect  a profit  of $332,430  on sales  of $650,653  (Ceballos
1977,  VI-107).
8.  "A Blooming  Industry  for  Importers,"  Miami  Herald,  Sunday,  May 8, 1988.
9.  See "Quiet  Boom in Blooms,"  The  New  York  Times,  June 18, 1986.
10.  In 1974,  carnations  represented  over 71.1 percent  of Colombian  exports,
roses .4 percent,  pompon chrysanthemums  22.4, and standard  chrysanthemums  6
percent.  In  1985, the figures  were, 58.3, 7.5, 27.1, and 2.4 percent,
respectively.
11.  Colombia's  dominance  among  U.S. imports  did  diminish  in the 1980..  (See
table  3.) Much of its  lost  market  share  was gained  by the  Netherlands  when the
dollar  and the  peso increased  in  value  relative  to  European  currencies.
12. At  the  time  imports  were restricted  by a  prior  import  deposit  system,  high
tariffs,  and a licensing  system  that grouped  imports  into three  lists:  those
prohibited  under  any  circumstances,  those  requiring  a  prior  license,  and  those
on a  free  list. Although  the  government  reduced  some  of these  controls,  import
protection  still  remained  at  high levels  (Berry  and  Thoumi,  1977).
13.  The  CAT subsidy  rate  was similar  to that  of the  previous  certificate. On
December 23, 1983, the CAT was replaced  with the Certificado  de Reembolso
Tributario  or CERT.
14.  A number of econometric  studies  support  the conclusion  that Colombian
government policies during  this  period were  instrumental in  promoting
27nontraditional  exports.  See  Diaz-Alejandro  (1976),  Hutcheson  and Schydlowsky
(1982,  147),  and, in particular,  Sebastian  Edwards'  analysis  in  Thomas  (1982).
15.  The data  are  obtained  from  U.N.  International  Trade  Statistics  Yearbook.
16. Tariffs  were increased  by  20  percent,  and  1,550  goods  were  shifted  from  the
free-import  list  to  the  prior-license  list  (Intel  -American  Development  Bank  1984,
263).
17. A  preliminary  CVD  investigation  was  initiated  against  producers  of  roses  and
other cut flowers (excluding  miniature  carnations)  on January 18, 1983.  A
similar  investigation  was  initiated  on  June  17,  1986  against  miniature  carnation
producers.
18.  The  DOC also  found  that  Colombian  producers  of  Roses  and  other  cut  flowers
had  used  the  Plan  Vallejo  to  import  fumigation,  irrigation,  and  cooling  devices.
19. The  first  formal  trade  case  during  the  1970s  was  a  CVD  investigation  against
Colombian  growers.  Although  the Treasury  Department  found that growers  had
received  benefits  under  the  CAT  program  (a  tax  credit  certificate  for  exporters),
no countervailing  duties  were  applied  since  Colombian  growers  agreed  not  to use
the  program.
20.  If rose  exporters  targeted  by earlier  petitions  are  also  included,  then  AD
or CVD  petitions  filed  in the  1980s  covered  all  major suppliers  of cut  flowers
to the  United  States  and 65 percent  of all cut flowers  imports.  This figure
excludes  imports  targeted  by the  unfair  trade  practices  petition  filed  in 1985.
2±.  They  would  have been  even smaller  if each companies  dumping  margin  would
have been  weighted  by their  sales,  rather  than taking  a simple  average.  The
largest  Colombia  growers  had  little  or  no dumping  margins.
22.  Other  factors  also  contribute  to Colombia's  lack  of sales  in the  European
market,  such  as the  paucity  of direct  flights,  high import  duties  and  the  need
to switch  flower  types  to conform  to European  preferences.
23.  See "Wilted  Bouquets  Flower  Growers'  Trade  Victory  No Longer  Smells  as
Sveet,"1  Legal  Times,  July 17,  1989.
24.  These  sources  also note trat  U.S. unfair  trade  actions  have increasingly
been applied  to these  other  Latin  American  countries,  so that the number of
production sites not under the shadow of the unfair trade mechanism is
diminishing.  U.S. protectionist  efforts  have had similar  effects in other
instances. It is  generally  recognized  that  the  textile  and  apparel  quotas  are
directly responsible  for encouraging  the spread of  textile production to
countries  initially  outside  the  quotas.
25. Demand  peaks  are  common  among  many  goods  and  services:  downtown  restaurants
during  the  lunch  hour,  movie  theaters  on  Friday  and  Saturday  evenings,  tollways
during  the  rush  hour,  etc.
28Table  1 Cut Flowers and Flowering Plants, Sales and Expenditures, 1949
Region or  Number of  Total sales  Average  Total  Wages  Coal,  Total  Value of land,
State  growers  sales per  expendi-  and  fuel oil  area  structures and
grower  tures .1/  salaries  and gas  eauipment
for  Total  $Per
heating  square
feet
1,000  dollars  -------1,000 dollars-------  Square  1,000
dollars  feet  dollars
North  8,668  149,222  17,215  148,642  64,613  13,889  163,065  245,566  1.51
New York  1,185  22,281  18,803  21,138  9,527  1,718  21,465  34,806  1.62
Pennsylvania  1,284  28,856  22,474  24,458  9,167  1,537  20,476  46,299  2.26
South  1,827  32,648  17,870  30,529  14,665  993  68,855  44,061  .68
Florida  430  13,536  31,479  9,182  4,778  23  40,554  11,307  .28
West  1,932  36,652  18,971  29,616  14,029  1,625  47,332  49,608  1.05
California  1,017  23,391  23,000  16,839  8,405  680  33,592  26,202  .78
United States  12,427  218,522  17,584  207,886  93,306  26,507  275,251  335,235  1.22
------------------------  As a percent of ----------------------
total  total  U.S.  ---------total sales-----
growers  sales  average
North  69.8  68.3  97.9  99.7  43.3  9.3
New York  9.5  10.2  106.9  99.4  42.8  7.7
Pennsylvania  10.3  13.2  127.8  84.8  31.8  5.3
South  14.7  16.8  101.6  93.5  44.9  3.0
Florida  3.5  6.2  179.0  67.8  35.3  0.2
West  15.5  16.8  107.9  80.8  38.3  4.4
California  8.0  10.7  131.8  72.0  35.9  2.9
United States  100.0  100.0  100.0  95.2  42.7  7.6
l/  Includes other expenditures  (such as manure) not listed in table, and imputed depreciation and capital
costs for land, structures and equiipment.  Depreciation costs  have been calculated at a 12.5 percent rate
and the interest cost of capital at an 8 percent rate of interest.
Source:  Author's calculations.  Based on information contained in U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1950
Census of Agriculture,  Horticultural  Specialties.Table 2 Major producing states' share of total production
Years
State  1957  1968  1974  1981  1985  1988
--- Share of Total Production ---
Standard Carnations
California  43.6  52.8  63.5  76.6  78.9  84.6
Colorado  24.9  21.3  27.2  20.8  19.6  14.7
New York  11.4  2.1  0.4  n/a  0.0  0.0
Ohio  7.3  2.8  0.8  0.4  1.2  n/a
Illinois  8.6  1.4  0.3  n/a  n/a  n/a
Pennsylvania  n/a  5.9  2.4  1.2  0.6  0.3
Massachusetts  n/a  5.2  1.6  0.2  n/a  n/a
Standard Chrysanthemums
California  59.7  46.2  61.6  78.9  83.6  82.1
Colorado  0.9  0.3  0.1  n/a  0.1  n/a
Pennsylvania  n/a  5.1  4.2  2.3  2.5  2.6
Illinois  12.3  2.8  1.5  0.6  n/a  0.3
New York  9.7  4.7  2.1  1.8  1.2  1.0
Ohio  9.9  9.6  8.1  4.3  2.5  1.4
Florida  1.8  6.8  3.1  n/a  n/a  n/a
Hybrid Tea Roses
California  37.7  39.8  43.1  60.4  62.8  65.6
Colorado  1.8  1.4  5.4  4.2  6.1  7.1
Pennsylvania  n/a  10.5  9.1  6.5  6.1  4.1
Indiana  n/a  5.8  5.8  5.2  4.9  3.5
Illinois  25.6  7.3  5.3  3.2  n/a  n/a
New York  16.9  6.7  5.8  4.5  3.9  3.4
Ohio  6.4  3.0  3.2  3.9  2.9  2.7
Michigan  6.3  2.6  2.4  2.3  1.3  1.2
n/a  =  not  available
Source:  USDA, Agricultural Statistics Board, Floriculture Crops.
30Table  3 U.S.  cut  flowers  market,  1966-1988
(value  in millions  of dollars)
Apparent  Domes-  Ex-  Im-  Colombian  Imports
Consumption  tic  ports  ports  Share  Rate  Share
Year  Import  produc-  2/  Total  of  of  of
Total  share  tion  1/  total  growth  A.C.
percent  ----  percent  -----
1966  141.4  .2  142.7  1.6  .3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
1967  145.9  .3  147.5  2.0  .4  0.0  10.1  n/a  0.0
1968  166.3  .5  166.2  1.8  .8  0.1  9.1  78.0  0.0
1969  198.1  .6  198.8  1.9  1.1  0.1  10.4  69.9  0.1
1970  199.7  1.1  198.6  1.1  2.2  0.4  18.3  227.4  0.2
1971  204.7  1.3  203.7  1.8  2.7  0.9  32.1  116.7  0.4
1972  223.1  1.8  221.2  2.1  4.0  j.8  43.8  100.3  0.8
1973  237.0  4.9  227.6  2.2  11.6  8.4  77.2  373.6  3.5
1974  251.6  7.9  234.4  2.6  19.8  16.5  83.5  97.7  6.6
1975  208.7  9.5  193.3  4.3  19.8  17.4  87.7  5.2  8.3
1976  227.5  11.1  209.1  7.0  25.4  22.6  89.1  30.0  9.9
1977  242.4  15.8  213.5  9.4  38.3  34.1  89.1  51.2  14.1
1978  279.7  20.6  230.7  8.6  57.6  51.7  89.6  51.3  18.5
1979  313.0  24.7  242.7  7.1  77.5  69.0  89.0  33.5  22.0
1980  331.3  26.7  250.1  7.4  88.6  76.5  86.3  10.9  23.1
1981  346.0  29.7  252.8  9.5  102.8  80.4  78.2  5.1  23.2
1982  n.a  n/a  n/a  9.8  130.2  94.7  72.7  17.8  n/a
1983  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  163.0  111.9  68.6  18.2  n/a
1984  464.2  46.1  271.3  21.3  214.2  137.5  64.2  22.9  29.6
1985  571.3  38.7  371.5  21.0  220.9  132.7  60.1  -3.5  23.2
1986  576.6  40.7  359.8  18.2  234.9  136.9  58.3  3.2  23.8
1987  665.1  36.6  439.5  18.0  243.6  143.0  58.5  4.4  21.5
1988  713.6  39.7  452.5  22.4  283.5  175.6  61.9  22.8  24.6
n/a=  not  available
A.C.=apparent  consumption
1/ Wholesale  value  of domestic  production  in major  producing  states.
2/ Imports  are  in terms  of customs  value,  not  on a cost,  insurance,  and
freight  (cif) basis.
Sources:  Imports,  U.S.  DOC,  U.S.  Imports  for  ConsumDtion  and  General
Imports.  TSUSA  Commodity  by Countrv  of Origin,  FT 246/Annual;  exports,
U.S.  DOC,  U.S.  Exports.  Schedule  E.  Commodity  by  Commodity;  domestic
production,  Doyle  Johnson,  Production  and Marketing  of Floriculture  and
Environmental  Horticulture  Products:  A  Statistical  Review.  1960-88,
USDA,  October  1989.
31Table  4 Colombian  export  incentives,  1967-Present
Exchange  Rate  Other  Incentives
Current  Peso-dollar  1/  Cut  Flowers
Year  account  index  CAT2/  PROEXPO  CAT  PROEXPO2/
balance  nominal  real
millions  ----------  percent  -- …---
of dollars
1967  -73  14.5  46.9  83.2  15.0  n/a  15.0  n/a
1968  -164  16.3  52.7  90.7  15.0  n/a  15.0  n/a
1969  -175  17.3  56.0  94.0  15.0  n/a  15.0  n/a
1970  -293  18.4  59.6  98.1  15.0  n/a  15.0  n/a
1971  -454  19.9  64.4  101.3  15.0  n/a  15.0  n/a
1972  -191  21.9  70.7  100.9  15.0  n/a  15.0  n/a
1973  -55  23.6  76.4  97.1  15.0  n/a  15.0  n/a
1974  -352  26.1  84.3  95.0  15.0  n/a  2.8  n/a
1975  -172  30.9  100.0  100.0  .1- 7.0  n/a  0  n/a
1976  163  34.7  112.2  98.6  .1- 8.0  n/a  0  n/a
1977  376  36.8  118.9  84.0  .1- 8.0  n/a  0  n/a
1978  258  39.1  126.4  80.4  .1-12.0  n/a  0  n/a
1979  438  42.6  137.6  79.3  .1-12.0  n/a  0  n/a
1980  -206  47.3  152.9  78.9  .1-12.0  n/a  0  n/a
1981  -1,961  54.5  176.2  78.8  4-12.0  n/a  4.0  n/a
1982  -3,054  64.1  209.1  78.8  4-12.0  n/a  4.0  n/a
1983  -3,003  78.9  255.0  83.7  5-20.0  n/a  5.0  n/a
1984  -1,401  100.8  326.0  96.1  5-25.0  n/a  1.0  n/a
1985  -1,809  142.3  460.1  113.2  5-25.0  n/a  1.0  .655
1986  383  194.3  628.1  132.4  5-14.0  n/a  0  n/a
1987  336  242.6  784.4  139.1  5-14.0  n/a  0  n/a
1988  n/a  299.2  967.3  139.2  5-12.0  n/a  0  n/a
.X  Period  average.
/ From  1984-1985,  the government  applied  rates  of 30 and  35 percent  to
products  exported  to  members  of  the  Latin  American  Integration
Association.
V/  Subsidy  rate  for 1985 based  on DOC countervailing  duty  investigation
of Colombian  exporters  of miniature  carnations.  This  rate approximates
the  aross  benefits.
32Table  5 U.S.  Trade  actions  against  cut  flower  imports,  1974-present
Outcome  of Investiaation
DOC  ITC
Type  Year  Type  Subsidy  or
of  initi-  of  Exporters  Dumping
case  ated  flower  Margins  1/
--percent--
CVD  1974  CF  Colombia  A, SA  10.20
EC  1977  CF  All  N
EC  1979  Roses  All  N
CVD  1980  Roses  Israel  A  2.02  NIT
CVD  1980  Roses  Netherlands  N  N
AD  1981  Roses  Colombia  D
CVD  1982  Roses,  OCF  Colombia  A, SA  4.00/5.00
AD  1983  Roses  Colombia  A  2.86  N
CVD  1983  CF  Mexico  N
UTP  1985  Roses  Colombia  D
UTP  1985  Roses  Costa  Rica  D
UTP  1985  Roses  Dom. Rep.  D
UTP  1985  Roses  EC  D
UTP  1985  Roses  Guatemala  D
UTP  1985  Roses  Israel  D
UTP  1985  Roses  Mexico  D
CVD  1986  SC  Canada  A  1.47  A
CVD  1986  MC  Canada  A  1.47  N
AD  1986  SC  Canada  A  6.80  A
AD  1986  MC  Canada  A  6.80  N
CVD  1986  SC  Chile  A  12.25  A
AD  1986  SC  Chile  A  28.78  A
CVDR  1986  Roses,  OCF  Colombia  C, SA rev.
CVD  1986  MC  Colombia  A, SA  1.09
AD  1986  SC,MC,SM,PM  Colombia  A  3.53  A
AD  1986  A,G,Gy  Colombia  A  3.53  N
CVD  1986  MC,SC,PM  Costa  Rica  A, SA  19.54
AD  1986  SC,PM  Costa  Rica  A  .74  A
AD  1986  MC  Costa  Rica  A  .74  N
CVD  1986  MC,SC,PM,SM  Ecuador  A  1.01  NIT
AD  1986  SC,SM,PM  Ecuador  A  5.89  A
AD  1986  MC  Ecuador  A  5.89  N
CVDR  1986  Roses  Israel  A  11.03/12.20/23.70  NIT
CVD  1986  MC,G  Israel  A  10.79  N 21
CVD  1986  MC,SC  Kenya  N
AD  1986  SC  Kenya  A  1.58  A
AD  1986  MC  Kenya  A  1.58  N
AD  1986  SC,PM,SM  Mexico  A  18.20  A
CVD  1986  SM  Netherlands  A  3.48  A
CVD  1986  MC,A,G  Netherlands  A  3.48  N
CVD  1986  PM  Peru  A  15.56  A
CVD  1986  MC,Gy  Peru  A  15.56  N
AD  1986  MC,PM,Gy  Peru  A  .47  N
(continued  on  following  page)
33Table 5 --  Continued
Outcome of Investigation
DOC
Type  Year  Type  Subsidy or
of  initi-  of  Exporters  Dumping
case  ated  flower  Margins 1/
-- percent--
ADa  1987  SC,MC,SM,PM  Colombia  A  4.40
CVDR  1987  Roses,OCF  Colombia  C
CVDR  1987  Roses  Israel  A  9.89
CVDR  1988  SC  Chile  A  10.00/8.00
CVDR  1988  NC  Colombia  C
CVDR  1988  MC,SC,PM  Costa Rica  C
CVDR  1988  Roses  Israel  C
ADR  1988  SC  Kenya  A  2.34
ADR  1988  SC,PM,SM  Mexico  A  25.41
CVDR  1988  SM  Netherlands  A  .66/.57
CVDR  1989  hC,SC,PM  Costa Rica  C
ADC  1989  SC,MC,SM,PM  Colombia  3.10
ADR  1989  SC,MC,SM,PM  Colombia  A  6.10
ADR  1989  SC,MC,PM  Ecuador  A  23.50
1/ Subsidy  rates  may change  with  changes  in the period  under  review.
2/ Israel became a "country under the agreement" in August 1985.
Legend for Table 5
DOC  U.S. Department of Commerce
ITC  U.S. International Trade Commission
USTR  U.S. Trade Representative
USCIT  U.S. Court of International Trade
Type of investigation:
EC/CVD/AD  escape clause/countervailing duty/dumping
-R  DOC administrative review of CVD or AD order
ADRa  amendment  of  DOC LTFV  order
ADc  dumping  margin  reduced  to  3.1 percent  by  USCIT
UTP  unfair  trade  practices  petition  filed  with  USTR
Outcome of investigation:
A/N/D  affirmative/negative/petition denied
SA/SA rev  suspension agreement/suspension agreement revised
C  growers found to be in compliance with suspension agreement
NC  noncompliance with suspension agreement
NIT  no injury test
Type of flower:
CF/OCF  all cut flowers/all flowers, excluding miniature carnations
MC/SC  miniature/standard carnations
SM/PM  standard/pompon chrysanthemums
A/G/Gy  alstroemeria/gerbera/gypsophila
34Table 6 Performance indicators for U.S. growers
Area in  Hours worked  Net income before taxes
Year  Sales  Produc-  by production  and officers' salaries
tion  workers  as Rercent of sales
Mill. stems  1,000  1,000
or blooms  sq. feet  hours
Standard Carnations
1983  286.9  9,153  15.7
1984  294.8  9,019  12.7
1985  290.3  9,065  8.3
Standard Chrysanthemums
1983  64.4  3,211  14.6
1984  68.0  3,212  12.1
1985  59.5  3,180  3.5
Pompon Chrysanthemums
1983  368.8  12,088  10.7
1984  361.0  11,549  7.7
1985  392.9  11,921  6.5
Miniature Carnations
1983  103.0  2,240  21.0
1984  111.3  2,191  14.8
1985  125.7  2,358  16.1
Cut Flowers Industry
1983  276,737 1/ 167,297  5,477  10.2
1984  289,453 1/ 170,834  5,697  8.6
1985  332,814 1/  174,242  5,809  6.7
1/ Units are thousands of dollars.  Total includes only the following
flowers:  standard  carnations,  miniature  carnations,  standard
chrysanthemums,  pompon  chrysanthemums,  alstroemeria,  gerberas,
gypsophila, gladioli, and roses.
Source:  International Trade Commission (1987).
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